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Abstract 
Purpose - The purpose of this paper was to investigate security decision making 
during risk and uncertain conditions and to propose a normative model capable of 
tracing the decision rationale. 
Design/methodology/approach – The proposed risk rationalisation model is 
grounded in literature and studies on security analysts’ activities. The model design 
was inspired by established awareness models including Situation Awareness and 
Observe Orient Decide Act (OODA). Model validated was conducted using 
cognitive walkthroughs with security analysts.  
Findings – The results indicate that the model may adequately be used to elicit the 
rationale or provide traceability for security decision making. The results also 
illustrate how the model may be applied to facilitate design for security decision 
makers. 
Research limitations/implications – The proof of concept is based on a 
hypothetical risk scenario. Further studies could investigate the model’s application 
in actual scenarios. 
Originality/value – The paper proposes a novel approach to tracing the rationale 
behind security decision making during risk and uncertain conditions. The research 
also illustrates techniques for adapting decision making models to inform system 
design. 
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1. Introduction 
Security analysts regularly face the challenge of justifying decisions made under risk 
and uncertain conditions. While uncertainty stems from various sources such as 
dynamic conditions and information limitations, complications in decision making 
also arise because risk stems from multiple factors, rather than a single root cause 
(Hoffman et al., 2017). Analysts aim at identifying the best possible option, given the 
limited information as few decisions are actually made with absolute certainty 
(Huber, 2014).  
Information limitations exemplify the difference between optimising in rational 
decision making where all options for a decision are known and satisficing in 
bounded rationality driven decision making where limited options are known 
(Simon, 1972). When decision making under risk and uncertainty is unsuccessful, the 
post-incident privilege of hindsight availed to others fails to portray the complexity 
of decision making in action. Equally, value is lost when decision making knowledge 
gained from those experienced remains tacit and incommunicable.  
To facilitate the transparent understanding of security decision making, we present a 
conceptual model providing systematic traceability to risk rationalisation. We 
validate the model using cognitive walkthroughs and illustrate its application in a 
study where analysts’ views on automating aspects of risk rationalisation during 
security analysis were elicited. This paper is an extended version of earlier work 
presented in M’manga et al., (2018). 
 
2. Related work 
Decision making research typically follows the normative or descriptive approach. 
Normative approaches model how decisions should be made; descriptive approaches 
understand how decisions are actually made. The normative approach’s usefulness 
may be seen in its ability in providing theoretical adequacy for rational choice, 
whereas the descriptive approach’s usefulness may be seen through empirical 
validity by uncovering insight in decision making (Bell et al., 1988). An alternative 
approach is to categorise decision making research based on the study environment. 
This may be the lab-based approach where studies are conducted in controlled 
environments and data collection is determined by predefined tests (MacKenzie 
2013), or the naturalistic approach where studies are conducted in real settings and 
data collection is based on the observation of actual events (Klein, 2008). The 
differences in approaches do not imply that one is better than the other, but that each 
is suitable based on research objectives. 
Descriptive research on expert decision making during risk and uncertainty focusses 
on context-specific decision making. This has been led by Klein's (1999) research on 
naturalistic decision making, where he identified that during uncertainty, experienced 
firefighters use situational familiarity to make quick decisions as opposed to 
weighing all available alternatives.  Similar work by Wong and his colleagues has 
examined how criminal intelligence analysts think (Wong, 2014: Wong and 
Kodagoda, 2015). They suggest that analysts flow from fluidity to rigour during 
decision making which is explained as moving from a loose story to account for 
identified data, to a formal rigorous and defensible argument. Hibshi et al., (2016) 
explores techniques taken by security experts as they transition through levels of 
situation awareness to identify security requirements. They identify that experts seem 
to skip some stages of situation awareness and attribute this to situation familiarity 
based on experience.  
The movement from ambiguity to certainty is the common point in the literature, 
however, much is still required to understand the rationale behind decision making. 
Normative models are particularity useful for this as they act as blueprints upon 
which sensemaking may be traced and communicated. Early work by Rasmussen 
(1974) on the Decision ladder template has played a key role in identifying the 
generic categories of activity in decision making, similarly, Boyd (1996) and 
Endsley (1995) played key roles in formalising the awareness steps leading to 
awareness. Regrettably, normative approaches are usually too high-level and 
generalised, rendering them incapable of providing low-level context-specific 
guidance. 
3. Model Design 
 
Figure 1: Risk Rationalisation Flow 
The model builds on our findings in M’manga et al., (2017), where we identified 
factors influencing risk interpretation and conflicts to security decisions, and lessons 
learned from the literature on awareness and analysts’ decision making activities  
(Werlinger et al. 2010; D’Amico et al. 2005). The model was formalised 
systematically using OODA (Boyd, 1996).     
The normative model consists of eight steps to risk rationalisation and contains two 
complementary elements; the Flow and Actions collectively referred to as the risk 
rationalisation process (RRP). The first element is a risk rationalisation flow (RRF) 
highlighting cognitive sequences and iterations during risk rationalisation. Illustrated 
in Figure 1, RRF indicates two alternative starting points; Reactive risk analysis 
beginning with Situation assessment and continues to Goal formation, while 
Proactive risk analysis has an inverse flow of beginning with Goal formation and 
continuing to Situation assessment. The difference is based on the understanding that 
incidents precede response strategy in reactive analysis.  Therefore, situation 
assessment begins before goals are formed, while the inverse is true in proactive 
analysis where goals are set beforehand. The second phase of RRF consists of the 
three information related steps, these are; Information needs assessment, Information 
exploration, and Information limitations analysis. Their adjacent positioning in 
Figure 1 indicates that the steps may overlap and occur in varying order. The final 
three steps occurring in sequence relate to options. These are; Options generation 
and analysis, Option validation, and Option selection. Risk rationalisation is an 
iterative process; this is illustrated in RRF by the reverse arrows at each point of 
possible iteration.  
The second element of RRP consists of the risk rationalisation actions illustrated in 
Figure 2. The actions address the lack of low-level detail in normative models by 
providing context-related meta-cognitive questions at each rationalisation step. 
Metacognition is defined as awareness or analysis of one’s own thinking processes, 
this may be extended as the knowledge of knowledge (what one knows about their 
thinking), and the regulation of knowledge (how one uses that knowledge to regulate 
thinking) (Schraw and Moshman, 1995). For instance, to understand the rationale 
behind the characterisation of a situation, the question “how may a situation be 
understood?” is posed. The questions are posed retrospectively, hence meta-
cognition. The risk rationalisation actions also present procedures for clarifying the 
questions. In the case of “how may a situation be understood?” the procedure could 
be through data correlation, which is the putting together of disparate data sets to 
derive meaning. By using the rationalisation steps, meta-cognitive questions, and 
procedures, RRP aims at understanding the rationale behind decision making 
irrespective of the decision maker’s expertise. We detail the eight RRP steps below. 
3.1. Situation assessment 
Situation assessment corresponds to OODA’s Observe. During this step, the aim is to 
understand how the decision maker identifies factors aiding in situation 
understanding and not the actual analysis of the situation. The meta-cognitive 
question “how may the situational be understood?” is presented and expanded into 
four possible procedures;  
• Knowledge of a situation: recognition through situation familiarity and the 
knowledge of normal. 
• Knowledge of evidence: recognising information affordances in an 
environment to achieve greater awareness. 
• Situational time-line: recognising whether a situation is static or evolving, 
current or elapsed.  
• Data correlation: recognising data correlation needs to achieve greater 
awareness. 
 
 
 
 Figure 2: Risk Rationalisation Actions 
3.2. Goal formation 
Goal formation is a step also corresponding to OODA’s Observe. The objective is to 
understand the strategies used to establish decision goals, identify tensions that may 
restrict goals from coming to fruition, and the determination of the relevance scope 
within which a decision is made. The relevance scope acts as a minimum level for 
the continued pursuit of a goal. For example, analysts interviewed in M’manga et al., 
(2017) expressed that the inner workings of some of the proprietary security products 
they used were unknown to them. However, based on the product’s benefit, they 
found uncovering the potential risk unnecessary. In other words, the relevance scope 
for pursuing the products risk was below minimum. 
 
3.3. Information needs assessment 
Information needs assessment is one of three steps corresponding to OODA’s Orient. 
The objective is to understand how the decision maker identifies information 
relevant for decision making and the filtering of excess information. The decision 
maker’s assessment is based on information credibility determined by factors 
identified during Situation assessment and the relevance scope identified during Goal 
formation. An example would be procedures taken in identifying false positives 
during an incident.   
3.4. Information exploration 
During Information exploration, it is recognised that decisions are determined by 
information availability and when information is unavailable, possible alternatives 
are explored. The focus is therefore placed on understanding the strategies for 
identifying the alternative sources of information. To the decision maker, the 
exploration of additional information sources is subject to available time. 
Information sources may be subject matter experts within an analysts’ environment 
e.g. legal officer, public relations manager, or external expertise such as CERT 
advisory (Computer Emergency Response Teams). 
3.5. Information limitations analysis 
Information limitations analysis is driven by the question, what remains unknown? 
This is presented with the aim of understanding how the decision maker identifies 
critical information gaps and the conclusion drawn from the knowledge. Information 
gaps refer to the known-unknowns critical for informed decision making. For 
example, it would greatly aid an analyst to acknowledge that an attack vector has 
been identified although the motive and capabilities remain unknown. Knowledge of 
the motive could hint at the possibility of follow-up attacks leading to better 
preparedness (Rashid et al., 2016). 
3.6. Options generation and analysis 
Options generation and analysis is the first of two steps corresponding to OODA’s 
Decide. Based on the cumulative understanding from the previous steps, the decision 
maker identifies possible options for decision formulation and their implications. For 
example, an analyst’s response to a data breach could be to refrain from disclosing 
the breach, even though data protection regulations advise otherwise. The aim of the 
step is to identify and understand the reasoning behind options considered by the 
decision maker. At this point, limited understanding may inadvertently lead to the 
first form of meta-risk, which is risk resulting from risk response e.g. increased threat 
exposure.  
3.7. Options validation 
Options validation focusses on uncertainty by verifying if there were elements of 
uncertainty hindering the decision making process and how it was managed. 
Evaluating one’s own decision is no easy task; the failure to validate an option 
introduces a second form of meta-risk, which is the risk of risk understanding. 
To provide a comprehensive understanding of uncertainty, we categorise it to the 
following four groups: 
 
• Environmental factors: dynamic environments, inconsistent or incomplete 
information from the environment. 
• Contextual factors: time limitations, situation complexity or magnitude. 
• Personal factors: experience, training and cognitive limitations. 
• Information factors: accurate, current, relevant specific, understandable, 
comprehensive, unbiased and comparable (Wang et al., 2005).  
 
3.8. Option selection 
Option Selection corresponds to OODA’s Act. As a final step, the most informed and 
objective option is put forward as the basis for a decision. The option should not 
come as a surprise where the rationale is traceable. 
4. Model flow validation 
The model was validated using cognitive walkthroughs (Rieman et al., 1995) with 
three security analysts from the UK (P1 -3). The three validated the model’s logic 
flow and not the tracing of risk rationalisation. P1 and P2 worked as part of a cyber 
security team monitoring events within their organisation and possessed 1-3 years’ 
professional experience in security. P3 worked for a counter-terrorism and 
intelligence unit and possessed over 24 years of relevant experience.  
Each participant was provided with a copy of RRP and given a brief tutorial on its 
use. Participants were then presented with a scenario about a hypothetical data 
breach that incorporated tensions related to possible decisions and uncertainty due to 
insufficient information. The scenario required the analysts to decide whether to 
make a breach on a university’s network known to affected parties in advance, after 
remediation or not at all. In addition, they had to take into account that some of the 
breached data was already on the dark web.  
The participants were asked to compare the model with decisions they would make 
in the scenario. Additionally, P3 ran a second validation scenario, based on his 
experience in counter-terrorism. Each walkthrough took approximately 40 minutes, 
and the participants presented their critiques of the model’s logic. Opinions were 
divided on whether Option validation was an independent step or a part of Option 
generation and analysis. We concluded that it remains an independent step to cater 
for understanding inexperienced decision makers lacking the ability to generate and 
validate decision alternatives consecutively. 
5. Model Application 
To demonstrate the application of RRP, a study was conducted with information 
systems (IS) personnel from a variety of organisations in Japan with the aim of 
eliciting their views on automating aspects of risk rationalisation during security 
analysis. Under real settings, the understanding gleaned would form the basis for 
nuanced security automation requirements that are grounded in user understanding as 
opposed to default automation for all.  
The findings do not aim to present statistical accuracy as we did not work with a 
representative sample size. Rather, the aim is to illustrate how RRP may be applied 
in facilitating understanding and designing for security decision makers (proof of 
concept). Demographic factors such as experience, security roles and industry could 
be used in representative and longitudinal studies to uncover decision rationalisation 
norms and deviations thereof. Findings could hint at hidden biases and suggest 
training and design requirements. 
5.1. Participants 
As illustrated in Figure 3, the nine participants were part of a group undertaking a 
training programme in cyber security. Two of the nine worked in security-specific 
roles; while the rest had security as a part of their other IS responsibilities. The 
participants had work experience ranging from one to ten years, four had a maximum 
of two years (referred to as novices) and the remaining five had a minimum of six 
years (referred to as experienced).  
5.2. Data collection 
Like the validation exercise (Section 4), participants were trained on RRP and 
provided with a cybersecurity decision making scenario containing elements of risk 
and uncertainty. Participants were then asked to indicate whether or not they would 
use automation during the different step of risk rationalisation during security 
analysis. We sought to elicit the participants’ general opinion, not one driven by 
existing tool capabilities. The steps considered were from situation assessment to 
options validation. Option selection was intentionally omitted as the objective was to 
automate with the human as the final decision maker (human-in-the-loop). 
5.2.1. Scenario 
You are a security analyst at a shipping company based in Tokyo. You have been 
monitoring the network traffic at the Osaka regional office and have noticed 
suspicious Twitter and Internet Relay Chat (IRC) traffic. There is the possibility that 
this could be an incident in progress. Following the RRP model steps, which parts of 
your security analysis would you automate to facilitate understanding?  
 
 
Figure 3: Study participants 
 
5.3. Findings 
5.3.1. All respondents 
Illustrate in Figure 4, the first part of the findings represents all respondents (novices 
and experienced) as one group. Situation assessment was the most recommended for 
automation with seven of the nine participants selecting to automate. Participants’ 
comments for the choice included:  
“Systems have a better understanding of network traffic and monitoring for 
signs of risk.”  
“It would be possible to issue alerts at the point of anomaly detection.” 
Information needs assessment had the lowest outcome with none of the participants 
recommending it, seconded by Option validation with one recommendation. 
Participants’ comments for not selecting Information needs assessment included: 
“When determining the necessary or unnecessary information, one’s 
experience or wider perspective would be required.” 
“It is ambiguous for a system to determine unnecessary information.” 
 
 
Figure 4: Automating security analysis (all respondents) 
 
5.3.2. Novice versus Novices 
Illustrate in Figure 5, the second part of analysing the findings aimed at identifying if 
there were visible differences in the novice versus experienced view. 
As an overall, the results indicate that the experienced where lesser inclined to 
automate. We could speculate that this reflects a lack of self-belief and tool 
dependency by the novices. Significant differences were observed under Information 
limitations analysis and Options validation where none of the experienced chose to 
automate, in contrast to the larger number of novices who chose to automate. 
Reasons for choosing not to automate the two steps included: 
 “New information might emerge continuously; thus, automation would be 
impossible.” 
“It would be possible to establish frameworks, but it cannot be automated.” 
 Figure 5: Automating security analysis (novice vs experienced) 
As explained above, we do not aim to draw too much from the findings due to the 
limited sample size, however, the clear difference in the novice versus the 
experienced choices indicates the soundness in the application of RRP as a nuanced 
view to risk rationalisation.  
6. Conclusion  
This work presented a normative model for rationalising security analysts’ decision 
making. The purpose of the model is not to propose a new approach to decision 
making, but rather to propose a systematic approach capable of communicating and 
providing traceability to the rationale behind security decision making during risk 
and uncertainty. To address this, we considered the shortfalls presented in descriptive 
approaches which usually provide no explanation for expert judgement and the 
shortfalls in normative approaches which are usually too high level to derive 
contextual meaning.  
We believe there are three benefits from the use of this model.  First, the model is 
designed as a series of steps, cognitive questions and procedures that may be used as 
a blueprint by stakeholders unfamiliar with risk analysis procedures in security e.g. 
proactive or reactive analysis. Second, the model may be used in training analysts be 
identifying gaps in their reasoning when compared to model steps.  Finally, the 
model may be used as a basis for eliciting design requirements that would facilitate 
decision making about risk through the identification of crucial areas of risk 
rationalisation in security.  
The model places emphasis on validation and the consideration of uncertainty by 
highlighting the iterative nature of decision flows, presenting an options validation 
step, and the consideration of meta-risk in two forms (risk of understanding and risk 
of response). We believe that the model complements existing decision making and 
awareness approaches lacking a focus on risk and uncertainty. 
The case study presented acts as a proof of concept on the application of the model.  
It illustrated how the rationalisation steps in security analysis could be considered for 
automation based on user requirements and understanding. We believe this is a 
sound approach for leveraging human and system capabilities for decision making 
about security risk. 
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